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 Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of sector-specific regulation imposed on 
broadband markets related both to efficiency objectives of regulators and to those 
of narrowly defined interest groups. We test hypotheses derived from the 
normative and positive theoretical literature employing recent panel data on 27 
European Union member states taking into account endogeneity of the underlying 
regulation and market structure variables. Our empirical specification employs 
three different estimators based on instrumental variables in order to identify 
causal effects. We find evidence supporting both regulators pursuing normative 
objectives and inefficiencies related to regulatory path dependence, bureaucracy 
goals and an inadequate consideration of competition from mobile broadband 
networks. Our results call for adjustments in the institutional design of the decision 
making process under the current European Union regulatory framework. 
 
[1] 
1 Introduction 
In a time of increasing digitalization, operators of “old” broadband networks are 
facing a challenging increase in demand for bandwidth and for meeting real time 
criteria. “New” broadband networks based on optical fiber technology (so called 
“Next Generation Network(s)” – NGN) enable a massive increase in bandwidth 
capacity and the adoption of entirely new services on the demand side. One of the 
main policy goals is thus to incentivize investment in new high-speed broadband 
infrastructure in view of its economic importance related to increased productivity 
and other positive externalities in major industry sectors (Bertschek et al., 2016). 
One of the most important aspects of the European Union (EU) regulatory 
framework for electronic communications is the regulation of broadband access 
infrastructures which form the basis for the entire digital economy. Since the very 
beginning of the liberalisation process in 1997/1998, broadband markets have 
been subjected to a broad system of wholesale access obligations under the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications markets (European 
Commission, 2002a). Access obligations have been imposed asymmetrically on 
the legacy infrastructure of market dominant operators, so-called “incumbents”.1 
“Wholesale-access-based” operators can rent the incumbent´s legacy access 
infrastructure typically based on cost-oriented wholesale prices for various access 
products which differ in scope of technological product differentiation. Wholesale-
1 The term “incumbent” refers to former – mostly state-owned – telecommunications monopolists 
of “legacy” copper-wire infrastructure that existed prior to market liberalization. Cable-TV coaxial-
wire networks also represent “old” broadband networks. However, only copper-wire based legacy 
networks have been subjected to sector-specific access regulations under the EU framework. 
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based access competition hinges directly upon a set of pre-defined wholesale 
access regulations. Provided access obligations are effectively implemented by 
the national regulatory authorities (regulators) alternative operators can offer 
competitive retail broadband services without getting engaged in time-consuming, 
costly, and risky roll-out of own access network infrastructure. In the early stages 
of market liberalization wholesale-access-based competition massively increased 
price competition and thus yielded an immediate static welfare gain. With respect 
to emerging NGN infrastructure, the EU regulatory framework has during the time 
of our observation foreseen a similar, although not quite as strict mandatory 
access pricing regime which is rather comprehensive and intense in comparison 
to the US or to fiber leading East-Asian countries (Vogelsang, 2013; 2015). The 
European Commission’s (EC`s) approach to the regulation of NGN can thus be 
seen as an extension of the EU regulatory framework originally created for the old 
broadband legacy networks. In particular, the regulatory framework has been 
supplemented by NGN related recommendations (European Commission, 2010; 
2013; 2016a) which form the relevant regulatory framework for NGN infrastructure. 
It appears that two decades of EU broadband regulations created a strong element 
of path dependence (Cave and Feasey, 2017).  
However, in the academic literature there is much more controversy whether NGN 
access regulation is still required. From a pure efficiency perspective2 regulation 
2 In contrast, the European regulatory framework explicitly emphasizes a consumer perspective 
(European Commission, 2002a, Art 8 (2) lit a: „ensuring that users, including disabled users, derive 
maximum benefit in terms of choice, price, and quality“). Regarding network operators only 
investment incentives are mentioned but not profits. 
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would be justified only in view of persistent monopolistic market structures that 
constitute an “essential facility” which cannot be economically replicated by other 
operators. The underlying essential facilities doctrine has its origins in US law 
(Arreda, 1989; Lipsky and Sidak, 1999) and basically applies to markets that 
exhibit natural monopoly characteristics.3 According to an EU interpretation of the 
essential facilities doctrine, legacy network operators would enjoy positions of 
dominance which, in the absence of mandatory access obligations at the 
wholesale level, would give rise to static and dynamic inefficiencies.4 Only if this 
case prevailed would a set of access regulations imposed on emerging NGN 
infrastructure be economically justified. In contrast, however, under the 
comprehensive sector-specific regulatory framework as issued by the EC in its 
directives, guidelines and recommendations and as imposed by most national 
regulators on old and new broadband markets, new regulations might also be seen 
as the result of path dependence and institutional dimensions. Against this 
backdrop, we want to address the following research questions: 
3 The doctrine goes back to the Terminal Railroads case in 1912. The specific conditions of an 
essential facility were laid out in the case MCI Communications Co v. AT&T (708 F.2d 1081) in 
1982. 
4 Under EC law the essential facilities doctrine has been based on Art 82 of the EC Treaty (Art 102 
TFEU) which prohibits abuse of market dominance. Later on the doctrine has also become an 
integral part of the EU regulatory framework (European Commission,1998). The implementation 
of the EU 2002 regulatory framework (European Commission, 2002a,b), however, led to a direct 
reliance on the concept of market dominance as applied under Art 82 (102), which entailed a more 
indirect linkage to the essential facilities doctrine; indeed, sector-specific regulations have opened 
up much more than essential facilities since the implementation of the 2002 EU framework.  
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RQ 1: Does regulation of new broadband infrastructure depend solely on 
market features related to dominance in new broadband markets (as it is 
supposed to be according to sector-specific telecommunications law and 
economic efficiency)?  
RQ 2: Does regulation of new broadband infrastructure also depend on old 
broadband regulations (path dependence) and other institutional factors (such 
as NGN regulation in other EU member states, EU harmonization)? 
Answering these questions yields some immediate and highly important policy 
implications. In particular, if our results would point to a strong element of path 
dependence, then this would fundamentally call into question the regulatory 
framework on efficiency grounds. 
A further complexity arises from the fact that wholesale broadband access is not 
exclusively based on regulation that is asymmetrically imposed on dominant 
operators (European Commission, 2002b, Art 12 and 13), but rests more and more 
on different forms of symmetric regulation (European Commission, 2010, recitals 
12, 15, 19, 27, Art 13 and 16) which are imposed (symmetrically) on all network 
operators irrespective of positions of dominance. Symmetric regulations, such as 
the provisions on mutual duct access sharing, are targeted to share investment 
risks and to decrease total deployment costs. In view of high investments required 
for a broad-scale NGN roll-out, symmetric regulations have increasingly gained 
importance in recent years. While such symmetric regulations can be justified from 
an efficiency and/or consumer welfare perspective, the question is why firms do 
not voluntarily engage in the same activities. One reason could be that such 
activities interfere with competition laws and therefore may require ex ante 
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authorization. In terms of the two research questions above symmetric regulations 
fall into neither category. They do not depend on market features related to 
dominance, and they are largely NGN-specific and therefore not path dependent.  
Our empirical investigation is the first that employs data on old and new access 
regulations in a comprehensive EU27 panel for the years from 2003 to 2015. Our 
econometric specification accommodates i) the categorical nature of dependent 
variables measuring NGN regulation and ii) potential endogeneity utilizing three 
alternative estimators (control function model, linear probability model and 
Arellano-Bond model) which all rest on instrumental variables panel estimation 
techniques. In view of both research questions we find supportive evidence on 
related hypotheses derived from the normative and positive theoretical literature. 
Section 2 first reviews the related literature and Section 3 outlines testable 
hypotheses based on our reading of this literature. Section 4 presents the 
empirical baseline specification and our identification strategy. Section 5 describes 
our panel data set. Section 6 discusses the main empirical results. Section 7 
summarizes and compiles relevant policy recommendations.  
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2 Literature 
Migration from copper or cable legacy networks to fibre-based networks takes 
place gradually, suggesting that, during a transition phase, two different sets of 
access regulations will exist in parallel and both, old and new regulations will have 
an impact on NGN market outcomes. Whereas new access regulations exert a 
direct impact on NGN markets, old regulations exert more indirect effects as 
shown theoretically in Bourreau et al. (2012). They might also shape new 
regulations. 
As there is no empirical literature on the determinants of NGN regulation available 
so far, we first refer to the NGN related literature on the linkage between old legacy 
regulation and NGN investment as reviewed in Briglauer et al. (2015). Whereas 
the theoretical literature highlights several opposing effects at the firm level, the 
few contributions from the empirical literature available so far point to a negative 
relationship. This corroborates the results of the literature that studies old 
broadband markets as surveyed in Cambini and Jiang (2009), which finds similar 
albeit less-pronounced empirical evidence. Indeed, the underlying differences 
between the economics of the old and the new broadband infrastructures are likely 
to aggravate the negative impact of access regulation on investment in the case 
of NGN. The main argument here is that the investment in NGN is more likely to 
suffer from the hold-up problem, because a large part of the legacy networks 
existed prior to the implementation of access regulation, whereas the fiber-optic 
elements of the access network need to be built anew. New investments might 
thus be subject to ex post expropriation by regulators in terms of strict access 
regulations. Anticipating this, infrastructure operators would not invest. This 
problem might be mitigated, if regulators can and do commit ex ante not to 
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regulate too strictly. Expectations also play a role if old regulations can be seen 
as a proxy variable for future NGN regulations as operators will form expectations 
that are shaped on the basis of the existing infrastructure regulation. In the 
particular case of NGN deployment, potential investors would as a result of 
regulatory path dependence expect stricter future access regulations of NGN 
infrastructure, the stricter the existing old broadband infrastructure is regulated.  
The theoretical literature relevant to our research questions can be divided into 
the normative and the positive literature, the former of which has evolved around 
the question of optimal wholesale access regulation (or the lack thereof) for legacy 
networks and NGN. Most prominent here features Bourreau et al. (2012), which 
distinguishes opposing effects for affecting NGN investments at the firm level so 
that the optimum will represent a compromise.  
Not addressed by Bourreau et al. (2012) is the case of competitive areas, where 
both an entrant and the incumbent invest in NGN infrastructure. This case is taken 
up by Inderst and Peitz (2012a), who find that this can lead to a prisoners’ 
dilemma, where both firms invest but would be better off not investing. Based on 
Inderst and Peitz (2012a;b), Vogelsang (2016) comes to the conclusion that NGN 
wholesale access should not be regulated if NGN investment is the objective. The 
main mechanism here is a Schumpeter effect, because not regulating the new 
infrastructure increases the appropriability of the investment rewards. Briglauer et 
al. (2018) study how the coexistence of access regulations for legacy (copper) and 
fiber networks shapes the incentives to invest in NGN infrastructures allowing for 
alternative firms with proprietary legacy network (cable operators) and the 
presence of asymmetric regulation on access to the incumbent’s fiber network. 
Regarding the incumbent, their results show that access regulation imposed on 
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fiber networks negatively affects incumbent’s investment decision while the cable 
operators’ decision to invest in fiber is not affected when they dominate NGN 
deployment. 
In contrast to the normative theoretical literature, there seems to exist no positive 
theoretical literature directly to our research questions. We therefore allude to 
more general contributions that we then try to apply to the current context.  
Path dependence of regulation of a NGN can have several reasons, which can be 
linked to i) established interest groups and ii) sunk past investment. These two 
types of reasons can themselves be linked to each other. There is a large literature 
on the effects of interest groups on regulation, going back mainly to Stigler (1971), 
Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983). The main insights from this so-called 
“economic theory of regulation” are that winning interest groups tend to be small 
and tend to have a very strong interest in the particular type of regulation (Stigler, 
1971). For instance, owners of sunk infrastructure would form a strong interest 
group because of the danger of regulatory expropriation. Furthermore, there tends 
to be more than one winning group, meaning that regulation will try to pacify 
groups to reduce their potential opposition to a policy (Peltzman, 1976). In an 
interest group context efficient regulation could result, if the increased surplus from 
such regulation can be used to pacify losing interest groups (Becker, 1983).  
Before the advent of liberalization and competition in telecommunications the main 
relevant interest groups were the regulated firms represented by their 
shareholders and employees (plus suppliers depending on these firms) and the 
end-users (which might have divergent interest among themselves). Now, after 
competition has arrived there are two new interest groups, non-dominant (i.e. 
 
[9] 
unregulated) infrastructure-based competitors, who do not have to supply 
wholesale access, and wholesale-access-based competitors. The wholesale-
access-based competitors have brought consumers low prices after a political-
regulatory equilibrium of high and cross-subsidized prices in the monopoly era 
prior to liberalization. This price effect has given these entrants popularity and 
political clout. In the current situation these entrants have made sunk investments 
related to the implementation of wholesale access in particular, and those 
investments are now threatened with stranding by NGN investments of the 
incumbent and of infrastructure-based competitors. Thus, while the incumbent and 
the other infrastructure-based competitors would like to see NGN investments 
unregulated, the wholesale-access-based competitors would like to see regulation 
extended to NGN in such a way that these competitors i) do not lose their sunk 
investments and ii) stay competitive in the new environment. Even though 
incumbents also cannot re-use all their legacy investments for the NGN 
infrastructure, they internalize stranding in their NGN investment decision 
(meaning that the Arrow effect is balanced by the Schumpeter effect). 
In terms of interest-group theory the existence of wholesale access regulation can 
be seen as a victory of access seekers and of end-users, who benefit from low 
downstream prices. While end-users often form a fairly weak interest group vis-à-
vis the regulator, they are often well-represented in the telecommunications laws 
that specify the long-run interests of end-users as a main legal objective (see 
footnote 2). This can mean that the objective of consumer welfare can dominate 
the objective of innovative investment (Vogelsang, 2017). This held in particular 
at the beginning of access regulation, when the objective of (wholesale-access-
based) competition and low end-user prices dominated, because previous prices 
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were viewed as exaggerated. The interests of incumbents with large sunk 
investments and of other infrastructure-based suppliers have at the time been 
taken care of by assuring that wholesale access prices cover costs.  
The emergence of NGN has been accompanied by new EC policies (European 
Commission, 2013; 2016a) that changed the objective from more static consumer 
welfare to innovative investment. Part of the reason for this change may have been 
triggered by East-Asian examples of NGN deployment that suggested a lack of 
European competitiveness on a World scale. This changed situation strengthened 
(or was a result of a strengthening of) the interests of incumbents and other 
infrastructure-based suppliers relative to access seekers and end-users. Since 
access seekers have substantial sunk investments, their interests are 
acknowledged in the EU in continued wholesale access regulation of the legacy 
copper network and a non-discrimination provision for wholesale NGN access. 
The economic theory of regulation assumes that regulators are politicians, whose 
main objective is to become (re)elected. Regulators, however, are often 
bureaucrats, whose main objective is a large and sustained bureaucracy 
(Niskanen, 1971). For such regulators continued regulation that requires 
substantial regulatory input is valued most. The bureaucratic objective of their own 
survival and growth is severely threatened by the emergence of NGN. NGN (along 
with its mobile broadband equivalents) will eventually fully replace legacy copper 
networks. Thus, if wholesale access regulation cannot be transferred from copper 
networks to NGN the position of regulators is in danger of being eliminated. This 
could happen if the new service were naturally competitive or if the old and the 
new service were to compete side by side well into the future. In view of the 
developments surrounding NGN and mobile broadband this is probably the 
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greatest threat to regulators (Vogelsang, 2016). This would be compatible with the 
Grajek and Röller (2012) interpretation of their empirical result, which is that 
regulators increase regulation in response to increased investments by the 
regulated firm.  
Besides valuing continued regulation bureaucratic regulators are affected by the 
aforementioned and other interest groups, because politicians interfere if their 
favourite groups are disadvantaged by the regulators and because interest groups 
can invest heavily in lobbying the regulatory consultation process. This picture is 
enriched by the interaction across the different layers of regulation in the different 
member states. On one side, the EC and the Body of European Regulators for 
Electronic Communications (BEREC) have substantial influence in this process 
issuing guidelines, regulations and recommendations that aim at a greater level of 
harmonization in EU member states. On the other side, national regulators are 
going to be affected by other regulators due to peer effects induced by a high 
number of regulators implementing a certain policy. 
Summarizing, a few normative theoretical and empirical contributions analyse the 
NGN investment and migration incentives related to access regulations. None of 
the studies examines the determinants of NGN regulation. As regards the 
contributions of the older positive theoretical literature, there has been no attempt 
made so far to examine empirically their predictions based on path dependence 
or interest-group behaviour in view of regulatory measures underlying old and new 
broadband infrastructure. From the older theory of regulation, however, the 
positive approach more likely induces path dependence than the normative 
approach leading to a different market outcome. This work intends to fill these 
gaps.  
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3 Testable hypotheses 
From the review of the normative and positive literature the following testable 
hypotheses can be drawn. 
If regulators tried to maximize welfare and if maximizing welfare in a dynamic 
sense meant an increased emphasis on NGN investment5 then regulators would 
largely keep NGN infrastructure free of regulation and would announce this 
beforehand and, in addition, include some commitment device.  
Based on an assessment of the essential facilities doctrine, duplication of NGN 
access infrastructure already justifies an absence of access regulation in 
competitive areas. In monopolistic NGN areas duplication in the form of substitute 
services could come from legacy networks provided they offer services from an 
independent competitor. As a consequence, if only the incumbent owns NGN 
infrastructure and is thus found to be dominant then a continuation of wholesale 
access regulation of the legacy infrastructure may be warranted in order to 
preserve competition with NGN. Competition from mobile networks (referred to as 
“fixed-to-mobile substitution”) is another relevant determinant for wireline NGN 
regulations because of its crucial impact on (de-)regulation as infrastructure-based 
competition from mobiles ultimately results in competitive areas.  
5 As indicated in the introductory section, we assume that additional NGN investment translates 
into higher welfare (net of static inefficiencies) in view of expected externalities and the empirical 
evidence based on the older broadband related literature. However, we admit that it is not fully 
clear that favouring NGN investment is welfare enhancing in all cases.  
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If regulators aim to maximize investment the following hypotheses related to NGN 
investment, NGN market structure and mobile competition thus emerge: 
H1 (normative literature): NGN investment will be negatively related 
to the probability of NGN regulation, as regulators would refrain from 
heavy regulation in competitive areas (high infrastructure investment), 
in particular, when controlling for the market share of the dominant 
operator. Furthermore, the existence of well-established legacy 
access regulations should – controlling for NGN market structure – 
lower the probability of NGN regulations because of a higher 
competitive intensity due to regulatory-induced competition. As 
regards NGN market structure high concentration levels will increase 
the probability of NGN regulation in view of economic efficiency and 
the linkage between market dominance and asymmetric access 
regulation embedded in the EU regulatory framework. Finally, high 
levels of fixed-to-mobile substitution should decrease the probability 
of NGN regulation, as mobile broadband provides a reasonable 
outside option to consumers and thus constrains market power of 
regulated operators. Since, as time progresses fixed-to-mobile 
substitution gains importance both for fixed legacy networks and 
NGN, the move towards NGN deregulation of these infrastructures 
should accelerate. 
Because path dependence is, by definition, history driven whereas efficient 
decision making is always forward looking, path dependence of regulation of 
legacy and NGN infrastructure would typically deviate from the efficient outcomes. 
 
[14] 
Whereas efficiency-oriented regulators would fully deregulate NGN and legacy 
infrastructures in competitive areas with infrastructure-based competition and 
would apply legacy regulation only in order not to hamper investment incentives, 
path-dependent regulators would simultaneously apply legacy regulation plus 
NGN access regulations. Path dependence that would differ from the above 
efficient or investment-inducing outcomes would indicate continued dominance of 
the interest groups that governed legacy regulation and/or dominance of 
bureaucratic objectives of regulators. It would be favoured by wholesale access 
seekers, regulators at national and EU level and, to some extent, by end-user 
groups, for example by those not likely to switch to NGN in the near future.  
Furthermore, the EU as a bureaucracy increases its institutional power by 
enforcing harmonization of regulatory policies across EU member states. In order 
to realize this, the EU regulatory framework is designed to establish a common 
and harmonized regulatory approach in EU member states which contain some 
explicit and implicit rules to “incentivize” harmonization and “punish” deviating 
regulators by requiring stronger proof of evidence under the consultation and 
notification procedures (European Commission, 2002a, Art 7; Renda, 2016). 
Hence, as a result of interest group behaviour, bureaucratic objectives of 
regulators and the EU the following hypotheses related to regulatory path 
dependence and implementation process emerge: 
H2 (positive literature): Regulatory path dependence would be 
expressed by a positive impact of the extent and strictness of 
wholesale access regulations imposed in the old broadband markets 
on the probability of NGN access regulation. The EC´s goal of 
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maximizing harmonization would be expressed by a strong pressure 
of regulators in implementing its framework and not to fall behind the 
regulatory implementation process in other EU member states. NGN 
investment will be positively related to the probability of NGN 
regulation, as regulators have strong ex post expropriation incentives 
in case of high investment. They will thus lower access prices in order 
to increase consumer surplus and to improve regulators’ public 
perceptions. In turn, if NGN investment is low, regulators feel obliged 
to induce further investment by lowering regulation by increasing 
access prices. 
4 Econometric specification and identification strategy 
4.1 Econometric specification 
In order to test the hypotheses presented in Section 3, our estimating model, in 
which NGN regulation is expressed by a binary outcome indicator for EU member 
state i and year t is related to a vector of regressors X (and β a corresponding 
coefficient vector), reads as follows: 
ܰܩ̴ܰݎ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൌ ܫሺ܆ܑܜƲ ઺ ൅ ߝ௜௧ ൐ Ͳሻ (1) 
Note that our outcome variable measuring NGN regulation takes on two unique 
values, 0 and 1. The value 0 denotes no NGN regulations imposed and 1 denotes 
that at least some kind of NGN access regulation is imposed in member state i in 
year t. I(∙) is an indicator function taking the value one (meaning regulation is 
imposed) if the latent (unobservable) variable X´β +ε is positive and zero 
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otherwise. The special case of a probit model has ε ~ N(0, 1) and the model we 
wish to fit is: 
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(2) 
where Φ is a cumulative density function of ε which is the standard cumulative 
normal in case of the probit model. Expected signs (in superscript round brackets) 
are based on the assumption of investment maximizing regulators and on the 
aggregate influence of selfish interest groups as expressed in H1/H2, respectively. 
In Equation (2) we first control for the role of NGN investment and NGN market 
structure as well as for competition stemming from mobile networks (fixed-to-
mobile substitution). Second, NGN specific access regulation is related to a set of 
old broadband access regulations as well as NGN regulations in all other (“non-
focal”) EU26 member states. The latter variable captures the idea that NGN 
regulation in member state i will also be influenced by the implementation of NGN 
regulation in other member states (j≠i). Thirdly, pre_reg takes on two unique 
values and captures the period before (pre_reg = 1) and after (pre_reg = 0) NGN 
regulation became effective in EU member states. As will be outlined in the 
subsection below, the vector of regressors X must be divided into a vector of 
(potentially) endogenous regressors Xend and a vector of exogenous regressors 
Xexog. 
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4.2 Identification strategy  
In view of our baseline specification in Equations (1) and (2) we have to consider 
NGN investment and NGN market structure as potentially endogenous, because 
they will be influenced by (past, current or expected) access regulations as 
indicated in the related literature; also, old broadband regulations might be 
endogenous, even though these have been implemented typically years before 
regulators first imposed NGN regulations; regulators might react for instance with 
deregulatory approaches as regards old access infrastructure when newly 
imposing or revising NGN regulations.  
Endogenous relations are partly mitigated as argued in Grzybowski (2005:55-56), 
because regulators react to demand and supply shocks typically with substantial 
delay caused by the legislative and technical implementation process; 
accordingly, there should be no contemporaneous feedback mechanisms. 
However, to ensure identification of causal effects we apply various sources of 
exogenous variation for all potentially endogenous regressors using the following 
three estimators:  
First, we apply a control function (CF) method which is feasible in this context as 
our endogenous regressors are continuous, rather than binary, discrete, or 
censored. Similar to two-stage-least squares (2SLS) estimation, CF estimators 
first estimate the model of endogenous regressors as a function of all included 
and excluded instruments, and derive fitted values of the errors. These errors are 
then used as an additional regressor in the main model. These two-step estimates 
are obtained using Newey’s (1987) minimum chi-squared (two-step) estimator and 
more general than maximum likelihood as the first stage function can be 
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semiparametric or nonparametric. The main advantage of the two-step estimator 
is, however, computational, because it does not require numerical search routines. 
This is of particular relevance in case of several endogenous variables.6 Given an 
index function I(∙) and a set of exogenous and endogenous regressors, Xendog and 
Xexog, respectively, the CF approach can be written as follows: 
ܰܩ̴ܰݎ݁݃ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊௜௧ ൌ ܫሺ 0 itH[ RJ
H[ RJ
L WHQGRJ
HQGRJ
L W ˟;˟; ሻ (3) 
ite L W
HQGRJ
L W =;   
where Zit is a vector of included and excluded instruments which are related in the 
first stage to the vector of endogenous regressors Xendog. Residuals are estimates 
of eit which is then plugged in the index function: 
ܫሺ )0 itite 	
H[ RJ
H[ RJ
L WHQGRJ
HQGRJ
L W ˟;˟;  (4) 
Equation (4) represents a traditional probit model controlling for eit with 
independent normal error νit. Note, however, that the CF approach requires that 
the first stage model is correctly specified to obtain consistent estimates.  
 a linearized version of 
Equation (2) by the linear probability model (LPM), i.e. by employing standard 
linear 2SLS ignoring the binary nature of our outcome variable. Despite the well-
6 One could also make use of the maximum likelihood method and the underlying index function 
approach to estimate the parameters in Equation (1) and (2). In our case a maximum likelihood 
estimator shows, however, substantial difficulties to converge with multiple endogenous 
regressors.  
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known flaws of the LPM it is attractive due to its straightforward interpretation and 
as its computational implementation enables all standard post-estimation 
diagnostics (not available in the CF approach).  
As a third estimator we employ the Arellano-Bond estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) that allows us to account for serial correlation in the data, while still staying 
in the LPM framework. While our prime objective is to detect path dependence 
across regulations underlying old and new (NGN) broadband regulations 
(Equation (2)), there exists most likely yet another underlying dimension of path 
dependence. When regulators take a decision on NGN regulation in a certain year 
that decision is likely to stay in place for several years. Because of institutional 
rigidities in the regulatory decision making process adjustment is in fact expected 
to be gradual only. The Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator addresses serial correlation 
and allows identifying both dimensions of path dependence related to NGN 
regulations. Doing so helps saturate the model, as the lagged dependent variable 
is likely to explain a large part of the variation in the dependent variable. One can 
then also estimate the long-run effect of the independent variables.7 Including a 
lagged dependent variable is not, however, enough to estimate its coefficient 
consistently even in a panel context as the lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 764). In order to address this 
7 One could model a partial adjustment mechanism, where the long-run effect of the independent 
variables would be obtained by dividing the coefficient estimates of the independent variables by 
one minus the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable. The idea is that an increase 
in an independent variable will affect the dependent variable this period and also next period 
through the lagged dependent variable, so that adjustment takes place but not instantaneously. 
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source of endogeneity, AB estimation is based on the first difference 
transformation: 
ܰܩ ௥ܰ௘௚௨௟௔௧௜௢௡௜௧ െܰܩ ௥ܰ௘௚௨௟௔௧௜௢௡௜௧ିଵ
ൌ ߚ ሺܰܩ ௥ܰ௘௚௨௟௔௧௜௢௡௜௧ିଵ െ ܰܩ ௥ܰ௘௚௨௟௔௧௜௢௡௜௧ିଶሻ
൅ ሺ܆ܑܜ
܍ܖ܌ܗ܏െ܆ܑܜି૚
܍ܖ܌ܗ܏ሻ઺܍ܖ܌ܗ܏ ൅ ሺ܆ܑܜ
܍ܠܗ܏െ܆ܑܜି૚
܍ܠܗ܏ሻ઺܍ܠܗ܏ 
൅ሺߙ௜ െ ߙ௜ሻ ൅ ሺߝ௜௧ െߝ௜௧ିଵሻ 
(5) 
The AB estimator is then derived within a generalized method of moments (GMM) 
framework (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 763-766) and reads as follows: 
ࢼ࡭࡮෢ ൌ ൥൭෍ࢄԢప෪
ே
௜ୀଵ
ܼ௜൱ࢃே ൭෍ࢆԢ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
ࢄԢప෪൱൩
ିଵ
൭෍ࢄԢప෪
ே
௜ୀଵ
ܼ௜൱ࢃே 
(6) 
Adjusting the interpretation of the matrices to the current context, the matrix ࢄԢప෪  is 
a (T - 2)×(K +1) matrix with t-th row (߂ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଵǡ ߂ܠԢ௜௧), t=3, …T, ܡ෤࢏ is a (T - 2)×1 vector 
with t-th row ߂ݕ௜ǡ௧, where ݕ௜ǡ௧ is NGN regulation and ܠԢ௜௧ includes endogenous 
regressors and exogenous regressors. ࢃே is the optimal two-steps weighting 
matrix and ࢆ࢏ is a block diagonal (T-2)×r matrix of included and excluded 
instruments: 
൥
ܢᇱ௜ଷ ڮ ૙
ڭ ڰ ڭ
૙ ڮ ܢᇱ௜்
൩ 
(7) 
In our case ܢᇱ௜௧= [ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଶǡ ݕ௜ǡ௧ିଷǡ ǥݕ௜ǡ௧ିହǡ߂ܠԢ௜௧,߂ܠԢ௜௧ିଵ,ܠԢ௜௧ିଵ , …], where we inserted 
our external instruments and their first differences in place of our endogenous 
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variables.8 The initial AB estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is called “difference 
GMM” which has been further developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998). The augmented version of the AB estimator builds on 
a system of two sets of equations – the original equation in levels and the 
transformed one in first differences – which allows a substantial improvement in 
efficiency and is called “system-GMM”.  
5 Data 
We employ an unbalanced panel data set of EU27 member states for the period 
from 2003-2015. In constructing our panel we use the following main data sources: 
First, for our dependent variables measuring NGN regulation, we refer to 
mandated NGN access regimes based on the public notifications of EU member 
states under Art 7 and Art 7a of the framework directive (European Commission, 
2002a). In addition, we use data from WIK (2012) and some individual data 
provided by BEREC on request of the authors as well as from a BEREC report 
(BEREC, 2016). Second, the EC’s “Progress Report on the Single European 
Electronic Communications Market” in conjunction with its “Digital Agenda 
Scoreboard” provides yearly data on old wholesale broadband access regulations. 
Our third main source is the database of FTTH Council Europe, which includes 
annual numbers of deployed NGN fiber lines for the EU27 member states.  
All sources and variable definitions are listed and described in detail in Table A.1, 
while descriptive statistics are provided in Table A.2 in the Annex. Section 5.1 and 
8 For simplicity of notation we do not distinguish in the ݔ௜௧Ԣݏ between the included and excluded 
instruments. 
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Section 5.2 below describe our dependent and independent variables, 
respectively. Instrumental variables are described separately in Section 5.3. 
Owing to the fact that some values are missing,9 there are fewer observations than 
the maximum number (27*13 = 351) and some 0.71% of all the raw data were 
calculated using linear interpolation or had to be extrapolated. 
5.1 Dependent variable 
As indicated in the introductory section, the regulatory remedies dealing with 
access to NGN fall into two broad categories, symmetric and asymmetric. 
Symmetric regulations are imposed irrespective of market dominance positions on 
all network operators and typically represent interventions which grant physical 
access to civil engineering infrastructure, in particular, to ducts. A closer 
examination, however, reveals that – while some ducts are owned by other 
companies, such as electric utilities – most of the relevant ducts are owned by 
incumbents, leading to a de facto asymmetric policy. Traditional asymmetric 
regulations, in turn, require only the dominant (incumbent) operators to provide 
forms of wholesale-based access to their physical network infrastructure such as 
so-called access to the “unbundled” fiber loop or wholesale “bitstream” broadband 
access; the latter enables less scope for technological product differentiation, but 
9 In particular, values on old broadband access regulations are missing for Eastern European 
countries in the early phase of our period of analysis (years from 2003 to 2006), as these countries 
entered the EU at later stages and thus were not subject to the EU regulatory framework and 
obliged to report data before. Hence, missing values are related to political decisions but not to 
NGN regulations or NGN deployment. 
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represents a much less cost-intensive business model for wholesale-access-
based operators.  
According to this ambiguity underlying the delineation of (a-)symmetric 
regulations, we measure NGN access regulation with two different categorical 
variables: First, ngn_wba is a binary indicator variable that measures if and since 
when traditional asymmetric NGN regulations have been effectively made 
available as mandatory wholesale broadband access. It takes on the value one 
for the year when asymmetric NGN access regulation was implemented for the 
first time in a certain member state as well as for all succeeding years (unless the 
remedy has been withdrawn later on by the regulator), and zero otherwise. 
Second, ngn_reg is another binary outcome which includes all asymmetric 
wholesale access regulations as captured by the variable ngn_wba as well as 
symmetric duct access. For reasons outlined above, one can interpret both 
outcome variables as describing the existence of access regulations based on a 
narrow or a broader definition of NGN regulation. These alternative definitions are 
part of our robustness analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the relevance of NGN access regulations in EU27 member states 
and its development during our period of analysis. As can be seen, NGN 
regulations have been imposed in 2007 in some member states for the first time 
with a strong increase in the number of symmetric and asymmetric NGN 
regulations since then. At the end of our period of analysis (2014-2015) we 
observe a total of about 70 NGN regulations implying that on average every 
member state imposed more than two kinds of NGN regulations.  
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Figure 1: Relevance (absolute numbers) of imposed NGN access regulations in 
EU27 
 
5.2 Independent variables 
“Old” broadband access regulation is measured first by the effectiveness of 
wholesale broadband access-based competition, wba_sh, which is the share of 
regulated and actually used “old” wholesale broadband lines related to the total 
number of retail DSL broadband lines (Bacache et al., 2014; Briglauer, 2015). This 
indicator varies continuously from 0 to 1 and is based on “local loop unbundling” 
(LLU), “shared access”, “bitstream” and “resale” access obligations which are 
made available under the EU regulatory framework. This share can also be 
interpreted to measure the strength of entrants as an interest group that favours 
the extension of wholesale access regulations. Figure 2 provides evidence on the 
relative importance of individual access regulations in terms of EU averages over 
a decade of access regulations. From this we infer that LLU based access is by 
far the most relevant mode of wholesale broadband access.  
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Second, while we have no data on NGN access prices, we have data on the 
monthly unbundling access price, denoted llu_price, which represents the most 
important access remedy in view of NGN migration incentives and is directly set 
by the regulators. Note that whereas the variable wba_sh captures the 
effectiveness of legacy broadband regulations by linking these to the 
corresponding market outcomes, the regulated wholesale access prices are not 
directly linked to market outcomes and thus do not provide any information on the 
effectivity of the remedy. Indeed, even very low access prices might be ineffective 
in view of a large number of technical annex regulations which serve as a pre-
requisite for effective wholesale regulations. However, controlling for access 
prices allows us an assessment of causal effects which are directly related to 
regulatory policy decisions imposed on the legacy network. 
 
 
Figure 2: Relevance (%) of old broadband access regulations in the EU 
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Whereas old broadband regulations are expected to capture regulatory path 
dependence, NGN regulation in other EU member states is expected to represent 
the harmonization pressure from the EC on the regulators in implementing its 
framework (Briglauer et al., 2018). This variable is denoted with ngn_eu26, and is 
defined as the share of EU countries (other than the focal country) in EU26 
countries that already introduced asymmetric access regulation of NGN. We 
expect that the higher the share, the more are deviating regulators pushed to 
adopt similar NGN access regimes. NGN regulation imposed in all other member 
states is considered exogenous, as it appears quite unlikely that this variable 
representing the EU26 average is systematically influenced by NGN regulation in 
a particular member state.  
Investment in new broadband networks is measured by taking the log of the total 
number of NGN lines deployed (“homes passed”), denoted with ln_ngn_inv, which 
represents real fiber investment in access infrastructure in physical units and 
includes all relevant fiber technologies as described in the technical variable 
definition in Table A.1. In particular, our definition includes hybrid-fiber business 
cases of incumbent (Fiber-to-the-Curb/FTTC) and cable-TV operators (Fiber-to-
the-node/FTTN). Note that the term homes passed refers to the number of 
consumers that have potential NGN access, but which do not necessarily have a 
corresponding retail contract.  
Competition and related NGN market structure is measured on the one hand by 
an NGN technology based concentration index, denoted with ngn_ci, which varies 
continuously from 0 to 1. It is equal to one if all NGN deployments are based on a 
single NGN technology (full concentration), such as the incumbents´ hybrid 
deployment scenario which still represents the only access infrastructure that is 
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subjected to asymmetric NGN access regulation.10 Lower values of the 
concentration index point to more competitive NGN market structures as NGN 
lines are then provided more equally on the basis of available NGN fiber 
deployment technologies. On the other hand, the variable ngn_inc_sh measures 
the share of the incumbents’ NGN lines (mostly FTTC based) to the total number 
of NGN lines. Note that market shares still play a crucial role in market dominance 
assessments11 and they are thus expected to also play a crucial role in 
determining the likelihood of NGN regulations in the EU regulatory framework.  
Competition from mobile networks is denoted with fms_bb as this variable 
captures the phenomenon of fixed-to-mobile substitution in broadband markets. 
The variable fms_bb is defined as the share of basic mobile broadband 
subscriptions to the total number of basic mobile and basic fixed-line broadband 
subscriptions and varies continuously from 0 to 1 with the upper limit indicating full 
substitution of fixed broadband lines. Mobile competition is considered as 
exogenous, as NGN regulations are targeted at wireline broadband access 
infrastructures, and, if at all exert only an indirect effect on fixed-to-mobile 
substitution via the effect of regulations on competition and the resulting retail price 
10 The only current exemptions are Belgium and Finland. In Belgium the cable network is subjected 
to access obligations next to the incumbent infrastructure resulting in a de facto duopoly regulation 
(at odds with the essential facility doctrine). In Finland there are a handful of bigger incumbent 
operators and numerous local and regional operators, which are regulated (as a specific outcome 
of geographic market definitions). 
11 The concept of market dominance in Art 102 TFEU and case law establishes a presumption of 
dominance at a 50% market share and a clear indication of dominance if market shares are greater 
than 70%.  
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level. However, as part of our robustness analysis, we will also examine this 
exogeneity assumption. 
5.3 Instrumental variables 
Our estimators (Section 4.2) employ various sources of exogenous variation:  
Firstly, from the previous NGN related empirical literature we know which demand 
and cost-side controls have been utilized in estimating reduced form NGN 
investment models. In view of our baseline specification (some of) these controls 
thus serve as immediate instruments for estimating the impact of NGN investment 
in Equation (2). Demand for NGN services is inter alia driven by the intensity of 
consumers’ use of broadband services and their affinity with ICT and Internet 
usage (i_iday). Consumers’ needs are furthermore determined by their average 
education levels (edu), since higher levels of education improve e-literacy skills, 
which considerably increases the utility derived from NGN technologies (Briglauer, 
2015; Grajek and Kretschmer, 2009). Costs of NGN investment depend on 
population or household density and other demographic characteristics. 
Urbanization (urban) is perhaps a better measure of deployment costs than 
household or population density, because a hypothetical move of all households 
to one city would not change average household density but would have a massive 
impact on average NGN deployment costs (BEREC, 2016, 17). Also, the housing 
structure, in particular the number of multi-dwelling units (mdwell_perm), crucially 
determines “economies of density” and thus average deployment costs (FTTH 
Council Europe, 2012b, 24-25).  
Secondly, cost controls not only provide valid predictors for NGN investment but 
also shape NGN market structure as certain cost conditions favour specific NGN 
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technologies and exert a strong impact on the profitability of the respective 
business cases of operators. In particular, high degrees of urbanization are 
typically correlated with lower market concentration levels, as several other non-
incumbent infrastructure operators (e.g. cable operators or municipalities) will find 
it profitable to enter NGN markets. A high degree of newly built multiple-dwelling 
units favours deployment of high-end (Fiber-to-the-home/building / FTTH/FTTB) 
NGN scenarios as fiber can be then directly and fully deployed to the customer 
premise. Furthermore, NGN market structure is likely to be shaped by the old 
broadband market structures and competition intensity in these markets (bb_sh). 
In particular, NGN market structure was largely driven in the past by investments 
of incumbent and cable-TV operators who have been the first to upgrade their 
legacy infrastructure to a large extent to NGN specific bandwidth levels due to 
comparatively low deployment costs of hybrid (FTTC/FTTN) NGN scenarios.  
Thirdly, regulation and regulatory intensity on old broadband markets can be 
instrumented by the corresponding development in all other (non-focal) EU 
member states (llu_eu26; wba_eu26, both variables are defined analogously to 
ngn_eu26) in view of our reasoning related to the regulatory implementation 
process in Section 3. 
Finally, in the AB estimation we use internal instruments for the lagged dependent 
variable, while for the endogenous independent variables we use the first 
differences of the external instruments and their lags.  
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6 Estimation results 
Table 1 reports the results of the CF model with alternative specifications based 
on different definitions of the dependent variable, ngn_wba and ngn_reg, and 
selection of controls. The bottom of Table 1 reports, as a goodness-of-fit test, the 
2-statistic for a Wald test. The bottom of Table 1 also reports a Wald test of the 
exogeneity of the instrumented variables which clearly rejects the null hypothesis 
of no endogeneity (p-value(exog)) in all regressions. This suggests that a regular 
probit model would produce inconsistent results. As in the 2SLS model, the order 
condition for identification requires that the number of excluded exogenous 
variables (that is, the additional instruments) be at least as great as the number of 
endogenous variables. The table notes contain the lists of instruments and 
instrumented variables.  
Although estimation results in Table 1 provide point and interval estimates of β, 
the choice probabilities (Pr[ngn_wba (ngn_reg) = 1|X]) and marginal effects 
(∂Pr[ngn_wba (ngn_reg) = 1|X] / ∂X) are typically of greater interest because they 
have more direct economic relevance. The latter shows how the probability that 
NGN regulation equals one changes when one of the regressors changes by one 
unit. Although the underlying CF two-step estimator does not allow for the 
derivation of marginal effects for a positive outcome, two-step estimates can still 
be used to determine the direction of effects and test for statistically significant 
relationships.  
From the coefficient estimates reported in Table 1 we can infer the following: First, 
and in line with our normative hypotheses (H1) we find in all regression 
specifications that NGN market structure showing higher incumbent shares 
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(ngn_inc_sh) and/or higher NGN technology concentration levels (ngn_ci) are 
significantly more likely to be subjected to NGN regulations. Furthermore, as 
regards NGN investment (ln_ngn_inv) the results indicate a negative effect which 
is marginally significant at the 10% level in some regressions suggesting that the 
normative hypothesis on NGN investment dominates the positive hypothesis. In 
view of our positive hypotheses (H2) we do not find support with respect to the 
market share of old broadband access regulations (wba_sh) nor as regards the 
status of NGN implementation in all other member states (ngn_eu26). Insignificant 
estimates for the variable wba_sh might be due to opposing effects as outlined in 
Section 3. We find, however, a significantly negative impact of the unbundling 
price (llu_price) implying that a lower unbundling price (i.e. stricter regulation of 
old broadband access infrastructure) makes also NGN regulation more likely. This 
provides evidence on regulatory path dependence underlying old and new 
broadband markets in line with the predictions from positive theory of regulation. 
In turn, this result is clearly at odds with regulatory efficiency, as strict cost-oriented 
regulation of old legacy infrastructure should exert competitive pressure on NGN 
services and thus make regulation on emerging NGN infrastructure less relevant 
and likely for given levels of NGN market structure. 
Finally, note that our main results appear to be robust with respect to alternative 
model specifications. First, our results not only hold for the more narrowly defined 
regulatory outcome indicator, ngn_wba in regressions (1)-(4), comprising 
asymmetric access obligations only, but it also carries over to a broader 
specification of NGN regulation which also includes symmetric (duct) regulations, 
ngn_reg in regressions (5)-(6). Second, our regression specifications are robust 
for alternative specifications of pre- and post NGN regulation periods, denoted 
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pre_reg_03_08 (which is equal to one for the 2003-2008 period and zero else) 
and analogously pre_reg_03_10.12 The latter period dummy captures the 
regulatory period after the EC issued its NGN relevant recommendations 
(European Commission, 2010; 2013; 2014). 
 
12 Note that we cannot control for year or individual member state effects as these would give rise 
to perfect prediction of the binary outcome variable. For the same reason we cannot define a 2003-
2006 pre-regulation period, although this would actually correspond to the no-NGN regulation era 
according to Figure 1.  
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Table 1: Results for the control function model (coefficient estimates) 
Notes: Regressions (1)-(6) have been estimated using the Stata procedure “ivprobit” (despite its name, ivprobit is a control function estimator). In regressions (1)-
(6) we instrumented the variables wba_sh, llu_price, ln_ngn_inv, ngn_inc_sh ngn_ci using the following list of (included and) excluded instruments: (fms_bb, 
ngn_eu26); llu_ eu26, wba_eu26, bb_sh i_iday, edu, urban, mdwell_perm. All regressions employ Newey’s (1987) efficient two step estimator to obtain the 
coefficient estimates and corresponding standard errors. t statistics in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Dep. var.: ngn_wba (0/1)  ngn_reg (0/1) 
Regr. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)                                  (6) 
wba_sh -0.089 -6.921 -0.789 -2.962   -0.284 -4.551 
 (-0.01) (-0.73) (-0.07) (-0.26)   (-0.04) (-0.55) 
llu_price -1.768** -1.638* -1.921* -1.882*   -1.652* -1.155 
 (-1.99) (-1.91) (-1.94) (-1.76)   (-1.85) (-1.48) 
ln_ngn_inv -1.163* -1.280* -1.262 -1.306   -1.330* -1.123* 
 (-1.66) (-1.80) (-1.54) (-1.52)   (-1.84) (-1.68) 
ngn_inc_sh 41.777** 40.432** 46.067** 44.845**   33.759** 25.640* 
 (2.43) (2.42) (2.26) (2.09)   (2.06) (1.82) 
ngn_ci 35.176 37.965* 35.170 34.820   39.051* 33.840* 
 (1.58) (1.71) (1.19) (1.19)   (1.74) (1.68) 
ngn_eu26 4.267 -3.472 6.794 -15.066   4.719 -1.701 
 (0.76) (-0.60) (0.51) (-1.05)   (0.89) (-0.35) 
fms_bb 13.854 13.679 13.873 21.828   17.093* 13.142 
 (1.53) (1.58) (1.33) (1.53)   (1.82) (1.59) 
fms_bb* 
pre_reg_03_10 
   -9.597     
    (-1.09)     
pre_reg_03_08  -9.608**      -8.302** 
  (-2.33)      (-2.22) 
pre_reg_03_10   2.365 -12.041**     
   (0.45) (-2.01)     
constant -10.346 -3.063 -11.221 3.656   -10.555 -3.976 
 (-0.68) (-0.21) (-0.44) (0.16)   (-0.73) (-0.34) 
2 21.961 22.476 20.903 19.184   20.541 22.680 
p-value( exog) 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.001   0.004 0.009 
df (exog) 5 5 5 5   5 5 
N 329 329 329 329   329 329 
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Table 2 reports the marginal effects derived from the LPM. Hansen tests of 
overidentifying restrictions suggest that our instruments – listed in the table notes 
– are valid. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic suggests that there is no 
underidentification except for regression (1). We also report the p-values for the 
Sanderson-Windmeijer (SW) first-stage chi-squared test for the different 
endogenous regressors to check for underidentification of the first stage.13 As a 
consequence, we dropped the underidentified endogenous regressor, ngn_ci, in 
regressions (2)-(5). Underidentification tests confirm the relevance of the 
instruments. In Table 2 in regression (5) we include a linear time trend variable, 
trend. 
Interestingly, in the LPM model path dependence in regulation is now picked up 
by the regulatory variable measuring the effectiveness of access broadband 
regulations, wba_sh. Its impact is significant and substantial in all regressions 
implying that an increase by one percentage point increases the probability of 
NGN regulation by about 0.5 percentage points. Furthermore, and in line with the 
results reported in Table 1 the estimated coefficients of the LPM suggest a positive 
and rather strong influence of the incumbent´s market share, ngn_inc_sh, on the 
probability of NGN regulation. An increase by one percentage point increases the 
probability of NGN regulation by about 0.5 to 1.1 percentage points. The LPM also 
provides strong evidence of harmonization pressure, as measured by the variable 
ngn_eu26. 
13 Whereas standard first-stage F-tests can be used to test weakness of instruments, these tests 
are no longer sufficient for regression models with multiple endogenous regressors (Sanderson 
and Windmeijer, 2016). 
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Table 2: Results for the linear probability model (marginal effects) 
Notes: In all regressions (1)-(5) we instrumented the variables wba_sh, llu_price, ln_ngn_inv, ngn_inc_sh, ngn_ci using the following list of (included and) excluded 
instruments: (fms_bb, ngn_eu26); llu_ eu26, wba_eu26, bb_sh, i_iday, edu, urban, mdwell_perm. All regressions employ standard errors that are robust to arbitrary 
forms of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. t statistics in parentheses.* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Dep. var.:   ngn_wba (0/1)   
Regr. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
wba_sh 0.636** 0.510*** 0.547*** 0.411* 0.339* 
 (2.31) (3.59) (4.04) (1.78) (1.66) 
llu_price 0.009 0.014 0.011   
 (0.59) (1.23) (0.96)   
ln_ngn_inv 0.004 -0.003 -0.006 -0.018* -0.021* 
 (0.24) (-0.30) (-0.54) (-1.74) (-1.81) 
ngn_inc_sh 0.638* 0.557** 0.622** 1.117** 0.951** 
 (1.91) (2.17) (2.36) (2.43) (2.40) 
ngn_ci -0.365     
 (-0.63)     
fms_bb -0.199 -0.111 0.131   
 (-1.07) (-0.85) (0.55)   
ngn_eu26 0.786*** 0.841*** 0.553** 0.838*** 0.837*** 
 (4.14) (5.79) (2.04) (6.90) (3.74) 
pre_reg_03_10 -0.080 -0.121 -0.192   
 (-0.64) (-1.14) (-1.60)   
fms_bb* pre_reg_03_10   -0.257   
   (-1.20)   
trend     0.007 
     (0.23) 
constant -0.032 -0.202 -0.071 -0.109 -0.068 
 (-0.08) (-0.82) (-0.27) (-1.05) (-0.78) 
F 80.836 126.125 104.431 110.244 142.175 
Hansen (p-value) 0.102 0.106 0.130 0.245 0.156 
SW Chi-sq test (p-value)      
     wba_sh 0.0533 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     llu_price 0.0115 0.0001 0.0001   
     ln_ngn_inv 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     ngn_inc_sh 0.0060 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0001 
     ngn_ci 0.2395     
     fms_bb      
Kleibergen-Paap (p-value) 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 
N 329 329 329 329 329 
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Finally, Table 3 reports the estimation results for the AB GMM-system estimator 
based on the linear probability model. Regressions (1)-(5) provide alternative 
specifications similar to the LPM specifications in Table 2. Note, however, that as 
this estimator is based on a first-differences approach (equation (5)) it also 
explicitly controls for any country-level fixed effects. We conduct a set of standard 
post estimation tests to verify if we should have any concern regarding our model 
specification: the AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) serial correlation tests and the Hansen 
tests of over-identifying restrictions confirm that our identification strategy is valid. 
The interpretation of the coefficient estimates in Table 3 is related to marginal 
effects indicating how a unit change in the regressors is changing the probability 
that NGN regulation is implemented. Hence, a coefficient of about 0.3 (column (2)) 
for the regulation on the old copper technology, wba_sh, implies that if old 
broadband regulation increases by one percentage point then the probability of 
regulation on NGN regulation increases by about 0.3 percentage points in the 
short run. The corresponding long run coefficient estimate (0.3/(1-0.55)=0.67) is 
in fact largely in line with the corresponding static LPM estimates. We observe that 
the effect of regulation imposed on the old broadband infrastructure is significant 
at the 10% level in regressions (1)-(5). Likewise, the coefficient of the variable 
ngn_eu26 is highly significant and exerts a substantial and positive impact on the 
probability of NGN regulations. The long run coefficient estimates are again close 
to the corresponding LPM estimates. Except for the coefficient estimates on the 
variable ngn_inc_sh, which appear to be insignificant in all AB regressions, LPM 
estimation results carry over quite well to the AB model.  
It is relevant to notice that we obtain these estimates even after saturating the 
model including the lagged dependent variable and country-level fixed effects. The 
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coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable is highly significant and – in 
combination with fixed-effects – already captures a large part of the total variation 
in the binary dependent variable. As expected, we find that there is a strong 
element of path dependence from one year to the next in the regulation of NGN 
as it takes time to take a decision and when it is taken it typically stays in place for 
a longer period of time in view of the average duration of market analysis 
procedures. In particular, we find that after controlling for the other variables NGN 
regulation displays a rather narrowly estimated autocorrelation coefficient in the 
interval of 0.55 to 0.59. This implies that, if NGN regulation has been in place in 
the previous period, there is a 55% to 59% chance to observe NGN regulation 
also in the current period due to this kind of regulatory path dependence.14 
14 In Table 2 and Table 3 we do not explicitly report the robustness results when using ngn_reg as 
a dependent variable; results are, however, available upon request from the authors. 
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Table 3: Results for the Arellano-Bond model (marginal effects) 
Dep. var.   ngn_wba(0/1)   
Reg. nr. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged dep. var. 0.562*** 0.547*** 0.548*** 0.587*** 0.573*** 
 (7.30) (7.75) (8.78) (11.20) (9.79) 
wba_sh 0.248* 0.296** 0.301** 0.197* 0.223** 
 (1.92) (1.96) (2.15) (1.77) (2.37) 
llu_price -0.005 -0.004* -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-1.08) (-1.68) (-1.60) (-0.35) (-0.24) 
ln_ngn_inv 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.96) (0.95) (1.05) (1.76) (1.80) 
ngn_inc_sh -0.059 -0.097 -0.094 -0.083 -0.105 
 (-0.57) (-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.98) 
ngn_ci -0.021 0.009  0.067 0.071 
 (-0.26) (0.17)  (0.94) (0.89) 
ngn_eu26 0.425*** 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.339*** 0.359** 
 (4.11) (5.34) (5.62) (3.41) (2.52) 
pre_reg_03_10    -0.073 -0.073 
    (-1.10) (-1.03) 
fms_bb     0.005 
     (0.04) 
constant 0.033     
 (0.34)     
AR(1) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.580 0.592 0.575 0.984 0.959 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.255 0.259 0.242 0.998 0.919 
Sargan (p-value) 0.635 0.673 0.725 0.863 0.864 
Hansen (p-value) 0.410 0.477 0.524 0.597 0.514 
N 320 320 320 320 319 
Notes: Regressions (1)-(5) have been estimated using the Arellano-Bond “system GMM” estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). In all 
regressions (1)-(5) we instrumented the variables wba_sh, llu_price, ln_ngn_inv, ngn_inc_sh, ngn_ci using the following list of (included and) excluded instruments: 
(fms_bb, ngn_eu26); llu_eu26, wba_eu26, bb_sh, i_iday, edu, mdwell_perm, urban. Up to five lags of the dependent variable have been used as GMM-style 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable. Two-step robust standard errors allow for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. t statistics in 
parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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As regards the competitive phenomenon of fixed-to-mobile substitution, we do not 
find any evidence for a significantly negative effect of the variable fms_bb in all 
regressions in Tables 1 to 3. This is quite remarkable given the massive dispersion 
of mobile broadband technologies and services during our period of analysis and 
since the roll-out of 4G (LTE) wireless broadband in 2010, in particular.15 
According to a report of the European Commission (2016b, p. 14), 4G mobile 
broadband availability reached 86% as of mid-2015, up from 8% in 2011 (Figure 
3). The comparative growth in NGN broadband was much lower in the same 
period (from about 48% to 71%). This competitive development clearly suggests 
that in terms of efficiency NGN regulation of wireline networks should have also 
become less likely especially during this period. For this reason regressions (4) in 
Table 1 and regression (3) in Table 2 include an additional term 
(fms_bb*pre_reg_03_10) interacting the fixed-to-mobile substitution variable 
(fms_bb) with a dummy controlling for the 4G rollout-period (pre_reg_03_10). The 
respective coefficient estimates still remain insignificant. 
However, the empirical result can be well explained if one takes a closer look on 
the market analysis provisions embedded under the EU regulatory framework. To 
initiate market analysis cases in individual member states, the EC at irregular 
intervals issues a list of so-called relevant markets susceptible for sector-specific 
15 Estimation results remain insignificant if we treat mobile broadband, fms_bb, as endogenous 
using the percentage of households who possess smartphones, smphone, and laptops, laptop, as 
instrumental variables (the corresponding Durbin-Wu Hausman tests suggests that mobile 
broadband can actually be treated as exogenous). Results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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regulation.16 Regulators may then adopt the underlying definition of relevant 
markets as is and assess competition and dominance issues within these pre-
defined markets. In case of regulators deviating from the EC`s market definition, 
however, the individual regulator is confronted with a full burden of proof in terms 
of sound empirical analysis related to market definition which represents an 
informationally and time-demanding task. Accordingly, the majority of European 
regulators, in particular smaller and medium sized authorities, has preferred to 
adopt the EC´s recommendation on relevant markets (Renda, 2016) which until 
now has excluded mobile broadband access products from the list of relevant 
markets (European Commission, 2014). 
  
 
Figure 3: NGN and mobile broadband (4G/LTE) household coverage in the EU  
16 Since the beginning of sector-specific regulation in EU member states (1997/1998), the EC has 
issued three relevant market recommendations in 2002, 2007 and 2014.  
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7 Summary and conclusions 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to examine the determinants of 
sector-specific EU regulation of NGN broadband infrastructure which are related 
to both efficiency-based objectives of regulators and the objectives of selfish 
interest groups and institutions. In view of our research questions we found 
supportive evidence on hypotheses derived from the normative and positive 
theoretical literature. 
In particular, CF and LPM estimates point to strong evidence for the relevance of 
NGN market share of incumbent operators in line with the efficiency perspective 
embedded in the essential facilities doctrine and the market dominance concept. 
In contrast, all estimation results suggest that competition related to fixed-to-
mobile substitution appears to be an insignificant predictor for the probability of 
NGN regulations even when controlling for the massive diffusion of mobile 
broadband services since the roll-out of 4G (LTE) networks. This suggests that 
little importance has been attached to the phenomenon of fixed-to-mobile 
substitution in terms of adequate empirical market analysis. Mobile broadband 
could enter this in three ways: First, as a relevant market of its own; second, as a 
service that is in the same market as fixed broadband access; third as a 
competitive influence on the dominance of a fixed broadband operator. 
Disregarding these channels can be interpreted as an indirect evidence of the 
ECs´ harmonization objectives to push for a common adoption of EU policy 
recommendations – which still foresee separate wireline and wireless markets – 
among EU member states which stipulate a necessity of fixed broadband access 
regulations.  
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We also found direct evidence for the existence of path dependence related to the 
old broadband regulatory regime: The LPM and AB estimators reveal path 
dependence underlying the variable measuring the effectiveness of access 
regulations and hence the impact of regulatory-induced competition pointing to the 
strength of alternative operators and consumers as relevant interest groups. 
According to the CF estimation approach (with some evidence also from the LPM 
estimation) a decrease in the unbundling price and NGN investment increases the 
probability of NGN regulations. As expected, the AB model estimates also found 
strong evidence for path dependence underlying previous and existing NGN 
regulations.  
Finally, the results of the linear probability and the AB linear probability models 
also indicate the existence of strong harmonization pressure stemming from the 
status of NGN regulation in all other member states. This result is also compatible 
with the positive hypothesis related to presence of peer effects across regulators. 
According to our findings the EU regulatory framework towards new broadband 
infrastructure exhibits indeed some inefficiencies related to regulatory state 
dependence, bureaucracy goals of regulatory decision makers and an insufficient 
consideration of competition from mobile broadband markets which presumably 
has led to an overemphasis of the incumbent´s wireline market shares in 
determining positions of market dominance and consequently in determining NGN 
regulations. This result is also in line with the positive theoretical literature 
predicting higher than efficient levels of regulation.  
Our results are of particular importance in view of the upcoming implementation 
of the recent major review of the EU communications framework (European 
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Commission, 2016a) in individual member states. The latter foresees measures 
to considerably extend access regulations by applying the concept of market 
dominance even into the context of narrow oligopolies, and by expanding 
symmetric remedies to a potentially large number of network operators and access 
elements. In view of our results such developments present strong concerns as 
the total number of NGN regulations appear to further increase despite an ever 
increasing competitive intensity in broadband markets. Accordingly, any new 
access regulations should be subject to close scrutiny as regards their normative 
foundation in order to avoid inefficient over-regulations. 
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Annex 
Table A.1: Variable descriptions and sources 
Variable Description Source 
 Dependent variables  
Asymmetric  
NGN regulation 
ngn_wba 
 
NGN regulation including all asymmetric remedies (ngn_wba): i) 
cost-oriented unbundling incl sub-loop unbundling (access to 
Fiber-to-the-node (FTTN/Docsis)/Fiber-to-the-cabinet 
(FTTC/VDSL) networks incl. virtual undbundled local access 
(VULA)) and Fiber-to-the-home/building (FTTH/FTTB) 
unbundling incl VULA ii) cost-oriented products based on fibre in 
the access network (local and regional wholesale broadband 
access to FTTN/FTTC and FTTH networks); this binary indicator 
variable is equal to one if and since when one of the above 
asymmetric NGN regulations have been implemented for the first 
time in a certain EU member state (and zero else or when 
regulation is withdrawn) 
EC, 
WIK, 
BEREC 
(A-)symmetric 
NGN regulation 
ngn_reg 
NGN regulation including asymmetric and/or symmetric 
remedies; the latter refer to cost-oriented access to ducts 
EC, 
WIK, 
BEREC 
 Independent variables 
NGN investment 
 
(Log of) 
Deployed NGN 
lines 
ln_ngn_inv 
(Logarithm of) Total number of homes passed by all individual 
NGN technologies (=FTTH/FTTB/FTTC/FTTN). “Homes passed” 
is the total number of premises, i.e. a home or place of business  
FTTH 
Council 
Europe 
 Old regulation and EU NGN regulation  
Price for LLU 
llu_price  
Monthly average total cost (=access price) for full LLU in € EU DAE 
Score-
board 
EU LLU price 
llu_eu26 
Average EU LLU access price in all other (non-focal) EU26 
countries 
EU DAE 
Scorebo
ard 
Wholesale- 
based access 
competition 
wba_sh 
Share of broadband lines based on old wholesale broadband 
access regulations (unbundling, bitstreaming, resale) to total retail 
broadband lines (based on incumbent´s DSL lines, excluding 
cable broadband lines) 
 
EU DAE 
Score-
board 
EU wholesale 
broadband 
wba_eu26 
Average share of broadband lines based on old broadband 
regulations in all other (non-focal) EU26 countries 
EU DAE 
Score- 
board 
EU NGN 
regulation 
ngn_eu26 
Share of EU countries (other than the focal country) that already 
introduced asymmetric forms of (a-)symmetric regulation of NGN 
EC, WIK, 
BEREC 
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Table A.1 (ctd.) 
 Competition and market structure  
NGN market 
share incumbent 
ngn_inc_sh 
Share of FTTC lines deployed by (asymmetrically 
regulated) incumbent operators to total NGN lines  
FTTH Council 
Europe 
NGN technology 
index 
ngn_ci 
Sum of squared market shares of relevant NGN 
technologies, ie ∑ (lines based on indivudal NGN 
technology/all NGN lines)2 
FTTH Council 
Europe 
Entrant's market 
share 
bb_sh 
Alternative operator´s retail market share in fixed 
broadband lines 
Eurostat 
Fixed-to-mobile 
substitution 
fms_bb 
Share of the total number of mobile broadband 
subscriptions (with internet access equal to 256 kbit/s) 
to the total number of mobile and fixed broadband 
subscriptions (with internet access equal to 256 kbit/s) 
ITU 
 Demand control variables  
Education 
edu 
Percentage of population with educational attainment of 
secondary education or higher, population aged 25 to 64 
years 
Eurostat 
Internet usage 
i_iday 
Percentage of population using internet services every 
day 
Eurostat 
Smartphones 
smphone 
Households that possess a smartphone as percentage 
of all households 
Euromonitor 
Laptops 
laptop 
Households that possess a laptop as percentage of all 
households 
Euromonitor 
 Cost control variables  
Building permits 
mdwell_perm 
Building permits for two and more dwellings as annual 
index normalized to 100 in 2010 
Eurostat 
Urban population 
urban 
Population of a country that lives in an urban 
environment as percentage of the total population  
MarketLine 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics 
 Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Dep. vars.:      
ngn_wba 351 0.399 0.490 0 1 
ngn_reg 351 0.439 0.497 0 1 
Regulatory vars.:      
wba_sh 335 0.193 0.193 0 0.970 
llu_price 335 11.43 4.623 5.110 42 
Market structure vars.      
ln_ngn_inv 346 10.57 5.952 0 18.20 
ngn_inc_sh 346 0.243 0.273 0 1 
ngn_ci 346 0.508 0.333 0 1 
fms_bb 336 0.548 0.191 0.075 0.991 
fms_bb*pre_reg_03_10 336 0.280 0.276 0 0.991 
Harmonization var.:      
ngn_eu26 351 0.399 0.396 0 1 
Excluded instr.:      
llu_eu26 335 11.43 3.124 8.817 19.86 
wba_eu26 335 0.193 0.0189 0.146 0.246 
bb_sh 337 0.507 0.158 0 1 
i_iday 351 0.698 0.143 0.250 0.950 
edu 351 73.86 15.94 19.80 93.50 
urban 351 72.87 12.09 49.65 97.86 
mdwell 351 145.9 123.6 10.92 913.1 
smphone 312 21.864 21.620 0.3 77 
laptop 312 34.201 23.809 0 87.5 
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